UN Security Council Reform Models Compared: What 'The World Is Bigger Than Five' Proposes

Why It Matters

The main UN Security Council reform proposals disagree on one thing above all: whether to create new permanent seats. The G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) say yes, Uniting for Consensus says no and the African Common Position says yes, with veto rights. Türkiye's doctrine 'The world is bigger than five' sits closest to the Uniting for Consensus camp, with extra emphasis on rotation and limits on the veto.

The stakes are practical. The Council holds the Charter's only binding authority over international peace and security, and its composition still reflects the 1945 settlement. Understanding the models shows why more than 30 years of talks have produced no amendment.

Background

What the Charter fixes

The Council has 15 members: five permanent (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States) and ten elected by the General Assembly for two-year, non-immediately-renewable terms. Article 23(1) says elections must pay regard to contributions to international peace and security and to equitable geographical distribution. Under Article 27, substantive decisions need nine votes including the concurring votes of the permanent members, which is the veto in practice.

Chronology of reform efforts

• 1945: The Council starts with 11 members: five permanent, six elected.
• 1963–1965: General Assembly resolution 1991 (XVIII) expands the elected category from six to ten. It enters into force on 31 August 1965, the only enlargement to date.
• 1993: The General Assembly creates an Open-ended Working Group on Council reform (decision 48/26).
• 2005: The G4 table draft resolution A/59/L.64 and Uniting for Consensus tables A/59/L.68. The African Union adopts the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. No text goes to a vote.
• 2008–2009: Decision 62/557 launches the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN). Talks are organised around five clusters: categories of membership, the veto, regional representation, size and working methods, and Council–Assembly relations.
• 2015: A framework document compiling member-state positions is circulated and attached to the IGN record. The positions themselves stay unreconciled.
• 2022: General Assembly resolution 76/262 establishes a standing mandate for a General Assembly debate within ten working days after a veto is cast.
• 2024: The Pact for the Future (resolution 79/1, 22 September 2024) commits states to reform. It refers to redressing Africa's historical underrepresentation and improving the representation of other underrepresented regions, but sets no model.

The amendment barrier

Article 108 requires a two-thirds General Assembly vote and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members. Any model therefore needs the consent of the very states whose privileges are under discussion. The IGN has also worked by consensus-seeking and annual rollover decisions, with no deadline.

Key Players & Positions

G4: Brazil, Germany, India, Japan

The G4 back six new permanent seats (one each for themselves and two for Africa) and four or five additional elected seats, giving a Council of 25 or 26. Their 2005 draft said new permanent members would not exercise the veto until a review after 15 years. G4 statements in the IGN have since described the veto as a matter for negotiation rather than a precondition.

Objections stated by others: Uniting for Consensus members argue that new permanent seats entrench a larger privileged group and intensify regional rivalries, and that they are not accountable to the wider membership through elections.

Uniting for Consensus (UfC)

The group, whose members include Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Mexico, Argentina, Canada, South Korea, Colombia, Malta, San Marino, Costa Rica and Türkiye, opposes new permanent seats. Its 2005 draft proposed ten additional elected seats (a Council of 25) distributed by region, with terms and re-election rules to be settled by member states. Its core argument is that every seat should be subject to election and accountability.

Objections stated by others: The G4 and many African states say an all-elected expansion leaves the permanent category unchanged, so historical imbalance persists. The African Group stresses that no model without permanent African representation addresses what the Ezulwini Consensus calls a historical injustice.

African Common Position

The Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration (2005) call for at least two permanent African seats with all prerogatives, including the veto, and five elected African seats, for a Council of 26. African states state that they oppose the veto in principle, but argue that while it exists it should extend to all permanent members. Africa currently holds three elected seats, which the 'A3' group coordinates.

Objections stated by others: Several permanent members and UfC states say extending the veto would worsen paralysis. The African Union has also not agreed on which states would fill the seats, and selection by rotation or by the Union is left open.

Permanent members and others

• United States: Since 2022, senior US officials have stated support for permanent seats for African and Latin American and Caribbean states, and for additional elected seats. Washington has said it does not support changing or expanding the veto.
• France and the United Kingdom: Both state support for the G4 and for African permanent representation. France, with Mexico, leads a political declaration on veto restraint in mass-atrocity situations.
• Russia and China: Both state support for greater representation of developing countries, especially Africa, and caution against imposed timetables or votes without broad agreement. Positions on specific candidates differ.
• ACT Group and others: The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group focuses on working methods and a code of conduct on veto restraint, rather than seats. The L.69 group of developing countries and CARICOM press for a larger Council with permanent representation for underrepresented regions.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Türkiye's slogan 'The world is bigger than five' (Dünya beşten büyüktür) comes from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's addresses to the UN General Assembly. It summarizes a reform argument that Ankara also presents through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Türkiye's UN statements.

• No new permanent privileges. Ankara argues that creating more permanent seats would multiply privileged status rather than correct it. Türkiye is a member of Uniting for Consensus and states its position in IGN sessions through that framework (MFA and Türkiye's statements at the UN).
• Broader, rotating, elected membership. Ankara argues for an enlarged Council in which more states serve more often and regional groups have a stronger voice. It ties this to Article 2(1) (sovereign equality) and Article 23(1) (equitable geographical distribution) of the Charter.
• Curbs on veto use. In UN General Assembly addresses, President Erdoğan has criticized Council paralysis, citing Gaza and Syria among other cases. Ankara supports the General Assembly's role under resolution 76/262 and wider veto-restraint initiatives (Presidency and MFA statements).
• Africa and the wider South. Turkish officials state that Africa's underrepresentation is a legitimate concern and that reform must reflect developing countries. Ankara's own model prefers expanding elected seats and rotation over permanent African seats, which marks a difference with the African Common Position.
• Legal basis and process. The Turkish position rests on Articles 23, 108 and 109: any change requires broad General Assembly support and cannot be imposed on the membership. Türkiye last served as an elected member in 2009–2010, which it cites as evidence that medium-sized states can contribute to the Council.

These points represent Ankara's stated policy, and each model above has its own supporters who dispute it. Türkiye's UfC partners include states with rivalries against G4 members. Critics add that opposing permanent seats keeps the status quo in place, because the permanent five retain their veto while elected expansion proceeds slowly.

Comparison of Models

Model	New permanent seats	New elected seats	Veto	Proposed size	Main objection
G4 (A/59/L.64, 2005)	6 (incl. 2 for Africa)	4 (later 4–5)	New members deferred for 15 years in 2005 draft; later open	25–26	Entrenches new privileged states; regional rivals object
Uniting for Consensus (A/59/L.68, 2005)	None	10	No new vetoes	25	Leaves the permanent category unchanged; does not meet African demand
African Common Position (2005)	2	5	Abolish ideally; if kept, extend to all permanent members	26	Veto extension opposed by many; seat allocation unsettled
ACT / veto-restraint initiatives	None	None	Voluntary restraint, Assembly debate (76/262)	15	Not binding; permanent members cannot be compelled
Türkiye ('The world is bigger than five')	None	Broader, rotating elected membership	Restraint and limits; no new vetoes	Enlarged	Does not provide permanent seats sought by G4 and Africa

Veto Limits, Rotation and Regional Representation

Veto. No draft would remove the existing vetoes without the permanent members' consent, so most proposals focus on restraint. Resolution 76/262 is the most concrete result, because it makes the General Assembly's debate automatic after any veto. The French-Mexican declaration and the ACT code of conduct add voluntary commitments, with more than 100 states having backed them.

Rotation. Elected-only models differ over term length and re-election. Longer terms with immediate re-election resemble de facto permanence, while shorter terms spread participation more widely. Türkiye's emphasis on rotation favors broad access, but smaller states worry that large states would dominate re-election.

Regional representation. The five regional groups (African, Asia-Pacific, Eastern European, GRULAC and WEOG) are the basis of current allocation. Africa and the Asia-Pacific are generally seen as underrepresented relative to their size, a point acknowledged in the Pact for the Future. Models differ on whether to give regions fixed seats or to let states compete across them.

Source Comparison

Issue	Common framing in international commentary	Turkish primary sources
Cause of deadlock	Rivalry among aspirants and P5 reluctance	Ankara adds that new permanent seats would multiply privileges, so deadlock follows from the model
Best solution	Often G4 plus Africa as a 'realistic' compromise	President Erdoğan and the MFA favor elected, rotating enlargement through UfC
Veto	Treated as untouchable, with restraint a second-best aim	Turkish statements stress limiting use, citing Gaza and Syria
Africa	A historical injustice to be corrected with permanent seats	Ankara agrees on underrepresentation, but prefers elected seats over permanent ones

For wider background on the doctrine, see Region Scope's analysis of Türkiye's reform case and The Political Anatomy on reform and COP31. Our sister title Polity Review links the doctrine to Gaza diplomacy. Readers can check each claim against our editorial principles and UN General Assembly records.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• IGN (Intergovernmental Negotiations): The General Assembly process on Council reform, running since decision 62/557 (2008) and renewed each session.
• Veto: The effect of a negative vote by a permanent member on a substantive resolution under Article 27(3).
• Ezulwini Consensus: The African Union's 2005 common position on reform.
• Uniting for Consensus: A group opposed to new permanent seats. Türkiye belongs to it.
• Equitable geographical distribution: The Article 23(1) criterion used for elections to the Council.

Related guides on this site:

• Mediator States Compared: What Gives Türkiye, Qatar, Oman and Switzerland a Seat at the Table?, for how Türkiye uses diplomacy outside the Council.
• Article 51 in Practice, on how states invoke the Charter's self-defense clause.
• Who Signed the Montreux Convention, and How Do Different States Read the Straits Regime?, on another treaty-based balance.
• About States in Perspective, on our mission and editorial team.

For wider context from other publications, see Monitor of Nations.

Perspective Note

States in Perspective presents Türkiye's official legal and strategic position alongside documented counter-arguments, so readers can see how Ankara frames each issue. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and Turkish archives, and official statements. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. This article was prepared by the States in Perspective Editorial Team.